Wyndham's Android app shipped with a database password inside it, the second such find in two weeks
A researcher found a hardcoded credential in Wyndham's app that opened a Salesforce-hosted database. Wyndham revoked it but won't say whether logs can show earlier access.
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An Android app is a file anyone can download and take apart, and that is the whole story of what TechCrunch reported on November 9. Security researcher Robert Wiggins of What Security found a password in the source code of Wyndham’s app. It unlocked an internal company database hosted by Salesforce. Wyndham says it has about 129 million enrolled rewards members; nobody outside the company can say how many of them were in that database.
What was behind the password
According to TechCrunch’s Zack Whittaker, the database held customer names, email addresses and Wyndham member numbers, along with customer login tokens, the kind of JWTs that keep a user signed in without asking for a password again, and company files and documents. Wiggins said the database contained millions of entries but he could not work out how many were customer records.
Login tokens deserve a note. A name and email address are a phishing list. A live session token is closer to a key, and its value depends on how long it stays valid, which the reporting does not say.
What Wyndham said, and what it did not
After TechCrunch contacted the company’s security staff, the credential was revoked, ending access. A spokesperson said the company has “taken steps to address the issue” and that its security teams “have no evidence of any unauthorized access.” Those are statements of what Wyndham has found, not of what it has searched.
The questions Wyndham declined to answer are the ones that decide whether “no evidence” means anything:
- whether it keeps server logs that could show who used the password before the report;
- how long the password was shipped in the app;
- whether it will notify customers or report to US regulators such as the SEC;
- how it will fix the problem for the long term, and whether it will start a vulnerability disclosure program.
Wiggins told TechCrunch he was glad the company fixed the issue, but that without visibility into past activity, malicious actors could have taken large amounts of data. Wyndham’s cybersecurity director, Michael Francess, said researchers can report problems to a security email address, which the article lists. Wiggins’s complaint in this and the earlier case was that he found no obvious way to report problems privately.
A pattern, not an accident
The reason this story travels is that it is not the first. Wiggins found a similar flaw in Applebee’s app about two weeks earlier, and used AI tools for both discoveries, according to TechCrunch. TechRadar’s account of the Applebee’s case gives the details: the app, which has more than a million downloads on Google Play, contained credentials for a company database holding names, emails, birth dates, phone numbers, ZIP codes and veteran status. Wiggins found no way to report it to Applebee’s or its parent, Dine Brands, so he went to TechCrunch, which checked the claim by finding the credentials itself and confirming they allowed entries to be created and modified.
Dine Brands fixed it and said its investigation had not found evidence of unauthorized access, adding that the investigation was ongoing. As of TechRadar’s report on November 2, Applebee’s had not notified customers.
TechRadar also lists earlier hardcoded-secret cases for context: a 2025 Cybernews analysis of more than 156,000 iOS apps that found over 815,000 secrets, and a February 2026 case in which state-sponsored attackers abused hardcoded credentials in Dell’s RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines.
What this means if you build apps
The lesson is not “use a better obfuscator.” A secret that ships inside a client cannot stay secret, because the client belongs to whoever installs it. Credentials that reach a database directly from a phone should not exist; the app should talk to a server that you control, which decides what each signed-in user may see. Where a key has to be in the client, it should be scoped so narrowly that leaking it costs little, and it should be rotatable without an app update.
The other part is the report channel. Both companies were reached only after a journalist got involved. A published security contact and a disclosure policy cost almost nothing, and in these two cases their absence is why the bug went to a newsroom first.
What customers can do
Nothing in the reporting says passwords were exposed, and Wyndham has not said it will notify anyone. Members who want to be careful can treat unexpected emails that cite a member number as suspect and watch their rewards accounts for activity they do not recognize. That is general hygiene rather than an instruction from Wyndham, which has given none.
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